Michigan Law Review
Volume 85
Issue 5 Issue 5&6
1987

Tolerance Theory and the First Amendment
James L. Oakes
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
James L. Oakes, Tolerance Theory and the First Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1135 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol85/iss5/28

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

TOLERANCE THEORY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
James L. Oakes*

THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERICA. By Lee C. Bollinger. New York: Oxford University
Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 295. $19.95.
Freedom of speech, according to Lee Bollinger's The Tolerant So-

ciety, is no longer a simple slogan or rubric by which we protect speakers against governmental regulation. It is, or has become, in the
United States in this century, a method of social interaction which
benefits, within wide bounds, the tolerator (and perforce his or her society) as much as, or more than, it does the tolerated (whose own intolerance as expressed in his extremism may be better exposed by the
tolerance of it than by its censorship).
Utilizing the "extreme" Skokie case both as springboard/catalyst
and checkpoint, Professor Bollinger reexamines the theory, function,
and role of free speech in our society. His underlying premise is that
"extremes are not to be understood as the peripheral cost of an inevitably imperfect world ... but rather as integral to the central functions
of the principle of free speech" (p. 133). He argues forcefully that "the
constitutional principle of free speech has taken on important new
meaning in this century" (p. 244). He constructs a "general tolerance
theory" (Chapter Eight). This involves tolerance of extremist speech
(e.g., the Nazis' march, swastikas displayed, in a community composed largely of holocaust survivors and descendants or relatives of
survivors). It does not merely result in curtailing legal intervention at
the edge of social behavior, but rather effectuates a "general social
ethic" (p. 248). That ethic, involving the toleration of most (but not
all) extreme speech, Bollinger suggests, focuses not so much on the
speech or behavior of the speaker/believer as on the social interaction
among the listeners/observers (p. 10). By carving out this very area
for "extraordinary self-restraint" (p. 10), society is led "to develop and
demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings" (p. 10) by way of
self-examination and "confrontation with the more complex, and less
comfortable, processes at work behind the desire to punish [extremist]
speakers, whether by legal or nonlegal means" (p. 127). Confrontation
with extremism, then, should involve the recognition of the intolerance in each of us (p. 127) and the ensuing dialogue - public and
• Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. -
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judicial - should sensitize us to a "general impulse to intolerance" (p.
234). Thus we are educated by self-examination (of ourselves and of
society) toward restraint and productive social intercourse (p. 238),
and away from an oversimplification of societal issues (p. 222) that
carries with it irrationality, exaggeration, censorship, and ultimately
the dangers or actuality of tyranny (p. 218).
This review will first encapsulate how Professor Bollinger constructs his thesis developing the tolerance function. It will then seek
to examine critically the extent to which the thesis draws from past
thinking and its underlying strengths, weaknesses, and implications.
In his preface (p. 4), Bollinger notes that to think about how far
the first amendment should be extended is inevitably to think about
the general theory of the first amendment; by examining what seems to
be almost peripheral he is led to examine what is central. He notes the
popular misconception (pp. 4-5) that in the first amendment area there
is a certainty or inevitability of interpretative legal reasoning that
somehow makes its meaning "preordained." So doing, he points to
the "deceptive clarity" of the language (p. 5) and suggests that there is
a "sea of possible interpretations" of the amendment (p. 6). He postulates that the contemporary rhetoric of free speech, drawing on a multiplicity of sources going back at least to Milton's Areopagitica, 1 may
not reveal the new meanings of "the free speech principle" (p. 7). Noting that the free speech idea is one of our "foremost cultural symbols"
(p. 7), Bollinger aims to show that there is new meaning to the principle which flows naturally out of "traditional patterns of theoretical
thought" (p. 8) but has not yet emerged clearly in first amendment
discussion. His focus is not so much on the value of the activity protected, but "the disvalue of the response to that activity" (p. 9). He
assumes that a good part of the speech behavior under consideration is
"often unworthy of protection" and "might very well be legally prohibited for entirely proper reasons" (p. 9). His vision is that the rationality and wisdom of tolerance of such speech activity derives from
the concept that it evokes the same feelings or reactions in our society
evoked by nonspeech behavior. He considers his inquiry preliminary
though essential to future debate based on an understanding of the
"goals of free speech" (p. 11).
Chapter One asks whether we are "enslaved to freedom." Bollinger notes the difference between the nonlegal response to deeply offensive speech (ridicule, humiliation, shunning, 2 etc.) and the legal
response, such as the federal court of appeals' and Illinois Supreme
1. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING,
To THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), quoted in part in N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B.
NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-3 (4th ed. 1976).
2. Shunning is a method of social reaction to behavior that has ancient antecedents. See E.
LE ROY LADURIE, MONTAILLOU: THE PROMISED LAND OF ERROR 302-03 (1979) (wearing
yellow cross required of heretics in 1308).
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Court's decisions 3 protecting the speech activity of the Nazis at Skokie. He then points to the resignation of 30,000 ACLU members when
their organization took up the defense of the Nazis. And he likens the
natural reaction of the ACLU members to the attack by Dean Wigmore upon Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 4 the
sentiments of which proved to be the auspicious beginning of contemporary free speech. In that attack5 Wigmore saw Holmes' free speech
dissent as a misguided, distorted social vision, ignoring greater fundamentals. Wigmore saw a "free trade in ideas" as already existing in
1920 "in every blasphemous, scurrilous, shocking, iconoclastic, or lunatic idea that any fanatical or unbalanced brain can conceive." 6 He
added bluntly: Why should society tolerate speech calculated to destroy it?
The Skokie cases Bollinger analyzes in depth (pp. 24-36). While
happy with their result, he finds the opinions disappointing as "avoiding" rather than "confronting" the social meaning involved and relying on the misused legal fiction of an appeal to the difficulty in linedrawing, which Bollinger decries (p. 37) as obfuscating and diverting.
Chapter Two analyzes contemporary thought about free speech,
using first what Bollinger calls the "classical model" and pointing out
its limits or rather limitations. The "classical" (because traditional)
model is that free speech is protected because it has values; it springs
from the age of enlightenment out of which the spirit of the American
Revolution came. 7 The values include truth-seeking and knowledgeadvancement, as a societal object, as well as, to a lesser degree perhaps, self-fu1fillment on the part of the individual speaker. More recently these values have focused through thinkers like Zechariah
Chafee and Alexander Meiklejohn, on the political or public context of
democratic self-government. Political dialogue is the paradigm aim
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 8 is the paradigm case for emphasizing "the practical importance of freedom of speech for a democracy" (p. 49). The theoretical defect Bollinger sees in the classical
model (p. 50) is that the self-governing democracy may itself decide to
limit its commitment to free speech activity. And to say that democracy should stop a majority from voting to punish public criticism of
the state leaves too many questions unanswered and too many cases
where there have been democratically sponsored efforts to control or
3. Collins v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of
Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
4. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
5. Wigmore, Abrams v. United States: A Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in
War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539 (1920).
6. Id. at 558.
7. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); H.
MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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regulate speech unresolved. Certainly, extremist speech like the Nazis' cannot be justified with truth- or knowledge-seeking as the value
to be protected. And while dialogue may, as John Stuart Mill argued,
be desirable or we may benefit by having a "thermometer for registering the presence of disease within the body politic," (p. 55) dialogue is
not invariably useful (p. 56). After all, we limit inflammatory or emotional speech before a jury. Bollinger also sees the classical model as
dealing inadequately with the whole subject of the harm speech can
cause, viewing only actions but not words as capable of inflicting injury, 9 and failing to take sufficiently into account the need of individuals to express themselves by way of prohibition of speech activity (p.
63). Speech often demands response and social activity depends on
interaction. Speech can hurt - racial groups, religious groups; it can
invade privacy; it can make us fear for our safety and well-being.
Have we not seen too much successful use of propaganda and other
manipulation of public opinion, Bollinger asks in effect, to put all our
free· speech eggs in the basket of democratic truth-seeking or knowledge-attainment?
Chapter Three explores the "fortress model" of contemporary free
speech theory and its limitations. Under this model, as explained by
Bollinger, we sharply, if quietly, constrict choices over speech regulation, the judiciary manning the fort, and the theorists give the judges
little room to maneuver by extending the protection of free speech to
the "hinterlands of speech." 10 The problem is not just with government, though there is a problem with government - Bollinger refers
to the Pentagon Papers 11 case; I might refer to Snepp 12 - but there is
a problem with the public as well, as the McCarthy era showed. We
recognize in effect the beast within us all. Protection of free speech is
9. Pp. 58-61. But see A. KOESTLER, JANUS: A SUMMING UP 15-16 (1979):
Man's deadliest weapon is language. He is as susceptible to being hypnotized by slogans as
he is to infectious diseases. And when there is an epidemic, the group-mind takes over. It
obeys its own rules, which are different from the rules of conduct of individuals. When a
person identifies himself with a group, his reasoning faculties are diminished and his pas·
sions enhanced by a kind of emotive resonance or positive feedback. The individual is not a
killer, but the group is, and by identifying with it the individual is transformed into a killer.
This is the infernal dialectic reflected in man's history of wars, persecution and genocide.
And the main catalyst of that transformation is the hypnotic power of the word. The words
of Adolf Hitler were the most powerful agents of destruction at his time. Long before the
printing press was invented, the words of Allah's chosen Prophet unleashed an emotive
chain-reaction which shook the world from Central Asia to the Atlantic coast. Without
words there would be no poetry- and no war. Language is the main factor in our superiority over brother animal - and, in view of its explosive emotive potentials, a constant threat
to survival.
10. P. 78. A recent statement of the fortress model is that of Norman Dorsen, constitutional
law professor and president of the American Civil Liberties Union, in Can Free Speech Become
Too Costly?, N.Y. L.J., July 25, 1986, at 2 ("I therefore suggest a 'maximum protection' theory
for free speech.").
11. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
12. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); see Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior Restrai11t
Since the Pe11tagon Papers, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 497, 514 (1982).
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"a very fragile enterprise" (p. 86), since something deep in human nature denies its importance. 13 Indeed it is precisely because the judges
in this Bollinger model are protecting the public against itself or its
own "intellectual incapacity" (p. 92; emphasis in original) that this
model is insufficient since, he asks, if the public cannot be trusted with
the free speech principle, with what can it be trusted? The fortress
model he thus considers unattractively elitist (p. 101). What value is a
legal right to speak, Professor Bollinger adds, when there is no one
ready to listen? And suppose the buffer zone protected is filled with
the enemy whose freedom of action (to drive for orthodoxy, or otherwise) is also preserved. In short, he considers that "[t]he fortress
model contributes to a tendency to rely excessively on a kind of legalistic method of solving social problems, and it is shortsighted about the
ultimate ends one can hope to achieve through the free speech enterprise" (p. 102).
In Chapter Four, entitled "The Quest for the Tolerant Mind," Bollinger lifts the curtain further on his tolerance function. Having
warned against trivializing the needs behind acts of intolerance and
the fortress model's recognition for the need of a check upon intolerant impulses, he now finds "a crucial social role for the free speech
principle in the context of the assumed reality of an impulse to intolerance" (p. 106). Free speech thus provides "a method of addressing a
ubiquitous social incapacity [intolerance]" (p. 107). We tolerate excessive speech activity so as to help better our intellectual character in
addressing nonspeech issues. Herein he recognizes "symbolic speech"
(p. 111), nonspeech behavior that communicates ideas, but he does not
stop there. He thinks of all human behavior and the impulse in all of
us to insist too strongly on our own beliefs and values, be they political
or religious, our attitudes toward aliens, foreigners, racial groups. He
recalls our recent experience with the hostages held by Iran and the
wave of anger and outrage in the United States, which threatened to,
and did, erupt into violence against Iranians visiting in the United
States with no connection to the Ayatollah's forces. His thesis, reemphasized through repetition, is:
that the purposes of the free speech enterprise may reasonably include
not only the "protection" of a category of especially worthy human activity but also the choice to exercise extraordinary self-restraint toward
behavior acknowledged to be bad but that can evoke feelings that lead us
to behave in ways we must learn to temper and control. What is important about speech is not that it is special but that the excessive intolerance we sometimes experience toward it is both problematic and typical,
in the sense of reflecting a general tendency of mind that can potentially
affect many forms of social intercourse. [p. 120]
13. Cf Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV.
11, 30 (1981) ("One can imagine a world in which anti-speech injunctions were sought and issued
with regularity; subpoenas to compel the testimony of news reporters were once a rarity.").
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Again, by selecting the area of free speech as one for public and rather
rigid rejection of intolerance, we can symbolize the "proper" way of
thinking so as to use it in all areas of behavior (p. 122). Thus (again
using Skokie to illustrate), extremist speech cases have at least three
uses for us: (1) to gain notice needed for the concept (of free speech)
to play its larger, symbolic role; (2) since extremists often represent the
paradigm of the intolerant mind at work, we can learn through observation of that intolerance; and (3) extremist speech may make us perhaps more conscious of the potential lurking behind more innocent
versions of the same ideas, e.g., the Nazis may remind us of the latent
forces of anti-semitism in the society (pp. 132-33). Here he notes with
satisfaction that having a body of judges do the line-drawing is altogether appropriate (because they are at least supposed to be tolerant).
Moreover, as members of the weakest branch, they need toleration to
be effective. The ambiguities inherent in the legal system and its caseby-case development also create a beneficial environment for public
dialogue. 14 What we hope to do in our quest for the tolerant mind is
to develop intellectual attitudes including a spirit of compromise and
objective distancing from our beliefs (p. 141).
Chapter Five explores the "internal dialectic of tolerance." Looking at the writings of Professor Meiklejohn and Justice Holmes, Bollinger finds passages in which these two thought about "the general
character of mind as it was reflected in the public efforts to suppress
speech" (p. 145). But instead of their having anticipated his theory of
tolerance, he sees them in deep conflict as well as profoundly ambivalent. Meiklejohn's seminal essay, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self
Government, 15 with its emphasis on protection of speech that is public,
i.e., relevant to self-government, and hence on the minds of hearers,
Bollinger finds not original (p. 149); its methodological reliance on article I, section 6, the speech and debate clause, as well as the due process clause of the fifth amendment, to read meaning into the first
14. I agree but would take the thought one step further. As I said in the James Madison
Lecture on Constitutional Law at New York University:
While I surely agree with Justice Douglas' assertion in the fourth James Madison Lecture
that "the Bill of Rights is not enough," and thereby fully comprehend that the rights carry
with them an equally important duty of good citizenship, I view, as I am sure he did, the
day-to-day concrete exposition of those rights not only as a continuing educational process
- educative to expositor and expositee alike - but as an activity at the heart of our democratic system. I take for granted the dialogue between the federal judges and the nation, on
a substantive level, and insist that our task is to present and to be able to defend reflective,
historically aware and contemporaneously applicable views of what every citizen's rights
and correlative duties are, as the questions arise in particular cases. Indeed, there is no
other institution in our society that continually carries on a systematic exposition of human
rights and their relationship to society. The "dialogue" then serves not only as an inspiration to both judges and nation, but as a bedrock against the encroachment of tyranny,
whatever its derivation, and especially when the sources of that tyranny are, as they are
sometimes, hidden in the "hearts of men and women."
Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 925-26 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
15. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948).
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amendment (and incidentally to permit the abridgement of "private"
speech) he finds "textual legerdemain" (p. 151). Yet he perceives in
Meiklejohn's awareness of the reality of democratic intolerance and
intent to protect even subversive speech a deeper confrontation with
the problem of extremist speech: under Meiklejohn's theory of selfgovemment, why cannot a self-governing society choose to prohibit
speech advocating the end of self-government itself (p. 153)? Thus
Bollinger sees as valuable the essay's real theme that "free speech provides the occasion for making a general assessment of the intellectual
character of the society" (p. 154), i.e., "creating a kind of [collective]
democratic personality" (p. 155).
Bollinger attributes Holmes's views to his relativism and individualism. The "free trade in ideas" and reference to the marketplace in
the Abrams 16 dissent come after Holmes' recognition of the "logical"
impulse to intolerance: "Persecution for the expression of opinions
seems to me perfectly logical," because intolerance derives from certitude either "of your premises or your power." 17 As Learned Hand put
it in a letter to Holmes, a sentiment which Holmes endorsed, "Tolerance is the twin of Incredulity." 18 Thus, while Meiklejohn rests tolerance on shared belief in community values, Holmes sees it as based on
lack of belief in the "truth" of those values (p. 163). Bollinger sees
neither as providing an acceptable or stable foundation for free speech.
Meiklejohn's "values" can become a justification for suppression (p.
166) while Holmes' self-doubt can become self-interested and nihilistic
(p. 166) since one must be skeptical of one's skepticism. Nevertheless
each has helped to "broaden the inquiry into the role of free speech as
a forum for defining certain fundamental intellectual values" (p. 169),
even while reflecting a fundamental ambivalence in our society toward
belief or beliefs; while beliefs are at the core of the impulse to intolerance, they are also the foundation of a system of morality and structure of societal behavior.
In Chapter Six, entitled "Drawing Lines and the Virtues of Ambiguity," Professor Bollinger seeks to "consider ... afresh" basic first
amendment law in the light of his "general tolerance theory" (p. 175).
Here Bollinger examines the exceptions to free speech protection, the
first of which is the prohibition against revealing information to an
enemy at war (p. 176). The clear and present danger test of
Schenck, 19 as modified in Abrams, 20 restated in Whitney, 21 and more
16. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
17. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. P. 163; see Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 756 (1975).
19. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
20. 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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recently revisited in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 22 deals with this kind of
"dangerous" speech, something which Bollinger agrees should be
regulable. The other three categories he examines are "fighting
words," libel, and obscenity. Protection is withheld in these areas by
virtue of their absence of social value, a method of reasoning Bollinger
finds unacceptable since "[i]t is self-restraint toward what we believe
to be without social value" (p. 182) that teaches us - as he sees it toleration. Rather he sees the exceptions as reflecting patterns of social thinking that are "residual behavioral needs" (p. 183), e.g., the
need to respond, say, by dueling to verbal insults, or reflected in the
attitudes toward family, community, and aggression that are affected
by pornography or societal reactions to it. Libel law does not fit his
tolerance model neatly but he looks both to the societal value of preserving honor and reputation as well as the individual harm to the
person defamed as supporting nontoleration. In the end he admits
that "the tolerance function must occasionally give way to the reality
of human needs" (p. 187).
Then, in a jump I do not quite follow, Bollinger sees the first
amendment religion clauses as supporting the importance of limits on
tolerance. Both freedom to exercise and insulation from establishment
reinforce the ethic that religion and politics ought to be kept separate.
This ethic exists because of the "tremendous potential of religious belief to produce divisive, even explosive intolerance." 23 We have kept
religion from creating social conflict by removing it from public discourse. In the end, Bollinger says:
Whatever verbal formulation is ultimately used as a starting point for
free speech analysis, it must be flexible enough to permit, and perhaps
even invite, consideration of the wide variety of social harm speech may
cause, while also strong enough to reflect the important institutional role
of free speech, that the central purpose of the enterprise is to push the
boundary of toleration far beyond what would be considered normal by
the usual standards of the society. [p. 192]

Thus a "conscientiously" as well as, I would add, a consciously "ambiguous doctrinal standard" (pp. 192-93) is what Bollinger is searching for, and he is willing to accept "clear and present danger" with the
term "danger" more widely and sensitively defined. He rejects the fortress model and fortress thinking. I will return to this later, as I think
it perhaps the weakest part of the book.
Finally he looks at his theory in light of time, place, and manner
regulation as well as of expressive nonverbal behavior, i.e., "symbolic
speech." He sees the tolerance perspective as permitting more speech
and recognizing time, place, and manner restrictions for what they are
as real intrusions, no less consequential than content regulations (with
22. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
23. P. 188. See note 9 supra.
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"manner" defined broadly enough, such a regulation goes to content)
(p. 202). As for symbolic speech, as in the case of graffiti, he sees the
way of thinking underlying the more verbal act as coloring the response to the act (p. 208) and, since the nonverbal act may also involve
harm to person or property, something can be said for regulating it
(pp. 210-11). Indeed, the line may be drawn at anonymous, secret acts
(like graffiti drawing) since they are not public.
Chapter Seven, "Searching for the Right Voice," is a coda on the
rhetoric of free speech - the literary enterprise - since it has brought
out the best writing of Holmes, Brandeis, Chafee, Kalven, and others.
Bollinger sees this rhetoric by its quality as emphasizing the "tremendous symbolic role" of the first amendment even if it often tends not to
view speech as the possible instrument of an intolerant mind. Bollinger believes that it would be "unfortunate" if people came to believe
that all intolerance of speech was bad and that there are "boundaries
of bad behavior that should not be crossed" (pp. 217, 220). And he
sees in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' rhetoric surrounding
free speech with its talk of tyrannical tendencies of governments and
rationality of people as, if not simplistic, at least outdated (p. 218).
Rather he would have free speech advocates be wary of their own tendency to oversimplify the complexity of the problems involved in a
given case. And he would not have the judge simply appear to be
totally personally disengaged, le., choiceless, or follow an interpretive
path that provides the least opportunity for interjection of personal
values, since this obfuscates and trivializes (pp. 227-28). Rather he
would have the judge state with caution his own attitude toward the
speech in question since the tension between the judge's and speaker's
views make a more persuasive argument for toleration (pp. 230-31).
He points out that tolerance may signify insensitivity to those injured
by speech, e.g., at Skokie, or even mask a desire to injure, i.e., antisemitism, racial prejudice, or the like; thus, "[t]olerance for the wrong
reasons can be a form of vicarious aggression" (p. 233).
Bollinger ends in Chapter Eight by setting "An Agenda for the
General Tolerance Theory," which he redefines as "the toleration of
undesirable and unwanted behavior as a method of pointing up troublesome tendencies within those wishing to be intolerant, often by the
community's engaging in self-restraint toward the very behavior it
seeks to avoid" (p. 238). He sees free speech as "stand[ing] symbolically as the gateway to social intercourse" (p. 238).
American society has evolved with this as a principle according to
Bollinger because it is a capitalist economic society, with pervasive
bureaucratic and professional systems, where personal preferences
tend to be submerged; because it is composed of large immigrant
groups of many different cultures and religions; and because it is stable
with a relatively homogeneous two-party system not likely to be sup-
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planted by splinter, deviant groups. The first amendment has taken on
meaning, he again reminds us, beyond merely preserving meritorious
speech or preserving an area of freedom for each individual beyond the
reach of the state, a meaning which can be seen in the context of extremist speech cases. The meaning is that free speech principles enable
us to see the elements in our thinking that distort our judgment in
drawing the lines that inevitably have to be drawn in a pluralistic society (p. 243). Free speech is thus a means, as well as an end.
Bollinger inquires whether by fostering tolerance in the free speech
context we are making the impulse to intolerance more attractive in
other, nonspeech areas (pp. 244-45). And he worries lest tolerance
turn naturally into passivity and uncritical obedience (pp. 246-47).
But these questions he leaves for future examination when free speech
is examined as a concept in social thought, as a general social ethic
rather than simply as a means of curtailing legal intervention into
speech. He sees in the end "the genuine nobility of a society that can
count among its strengths a consciousness of its own weaknesses" (p.
248).
Has Professor Bollinger said anything new? Indeed he has, even if
some of his concepts have real antecedents. I have reexamined some
of the most recent works by several scholars of the highest repute and
for whom I have the greatest respect: Thomas Emerson's The System
of Freedom of Expression, 24 Laurence Tribe's American Constitutional
Law 25 and Constitutional Choices, 26 the late Melville Nimmer's Nimmer on Freedom of Speech, 27 Vincent Blasi's The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, 28 Kenneth Karst's Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 29 as well as Professor Bollinger's
colleague at Michigan, Frederick Schauer's Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. 30
Emerson's four main premises for the system of freedom of expression include "individual self-fulfillment," "advancing knowledge and
discovering truth," "participation in decision making by all members
of society," and "achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable
community, of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavages and necessary consensus." He comes closest to anticipating
Bollinger's tolerance thesis in the fourth premise which sees
open discussion promot[ing] greater cohesion in a society because people
24. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
25. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
26. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES ch. 13 (1985).
27. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH ch. 1 (1984).
28. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1911 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J,
523, 550.
29. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20
(1975).
30. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
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are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they have a
part in the decision-making process. . . . Freedom of expression thus
provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a
society can take place without destroying the society. 31
Tribe takes a different approach, asking the question: Is freedom
of speech only a nexus to some other end, e.g., successful self-government, or is it an end in itself? He criticizes Meiklejohn's and Holmes'
conceptions as "too focused on intellect and rationality" and insufficiently accommodating to the emotive role of free speech. This role,
as set forth by Justice Harlan in Cohen v. California, 32 derives from
our belief in "the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests." Thus freedom of speech is an end in itself
and "a constitutive part of personal and group autonomy." 33 Tribe
insists that "[a]ny adequate conception of freedom of speech must ...
draw upon several strands of theory in order to protect a rich variety
of expressional modes." 34 But while he comes close, he does not expressly rely on or postulate Bollinger's tolerance function.
Nimmer speaks principally of the "enlightenment function" but
also of the "self-fulfillm.ent function" and the "safety valve function"
of free speech. While the "safety valve function" as set forth by Brandeis in Whitney 35 might be thought to be the flip side of Bollinger's
tolerance theory, it proceeds basically on the premise that "repression
breeds hate" which "menaces stable government," or, as Nimmer puts
it, men will be less prone to violence when speech is an emotional
outlet. 36 As Nimmer points out, however, there are at least two other
aspects to the safety-valve function seen by Brandeis - first the effect
on those in power, permitting them to respond to grievances, 37 and,
second, the effect on audiences by enabling them to avoid behavior
aimed at outrage and protest. 38 There is thus a hint of the tolerance
theory with Nimmer's oblique reference to Richmond Newspapers and
31. T. EMERSON, supra note 24, at 6-7.
32. 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
33. L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 579.
34. Id.
35. But they [the Founding Fathers] knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law - the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
assembly should be guaranteed.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
36. See M. NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 1.04 & n.4 (citing Greenawalt, Speech and Crime,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 645, 672-73).
37. M. NIMMER, supra note 27, at§ 1.04 n.1 (citing Blasi, supra note 28 at 550).
38. Id. at § 1.04 n.3 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571
(1980)).
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its footnote reference to audience. But in the end Nimmer states that
"[t]he safety valve function is probably much too ephemeral and speculative for it, in itself, to justify speech which might otherwise be
abridged by reason of given anti-speech interests."39 He thus does not
envisage a general principle of tolerance at work.
Vincent Blasi recognizes that our basic first amendment theories
developed in response to cases involving anarchists and socialists in
the 1920s, Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1940s, and communists in the
1950s, litigants who pressed claims either to engage in advocacy or to
keep their beliefs private.40 Those theories included:
(1) a concept of individual autonomy concerning personal beliefs; (2) a
commitment to diversity in a wide range of affairs, summed up in the
metaphor of a "marketplace of ideas"; and (3) a theory of political community known as "self-government," which holds that each member of
the polity, no matter how eccentric or humble, occupies a vital role in
the governing process and thus enjoys a right to hear and be heard on all
matters relevant to governance. 4 1

But the civil rights and antiwar movements with new tactics to
influence the collective consciousness presented issues not soluble in
terms of fair play for the dispossessed. Large news organizations also
became involved in challenging governmental and social orthodoxy.
Thus Blasi sees "values relating to the concept of countervailing power
in a democratic state"42 as figuring in the disputes of today. Calling
for "fresh thinking at the theoretical level,"43 Professor Bollinger's
former Michigan Law School colleague cites the law oflibel since New
York Times v. Sullivan as a "series of unsuccessful efforts to adapt
traditional free-speech theories ... to what is really a problem of corporate incentives and responsibilities."44 Blasi makes the point that
"our articulated understanding of First Amendment values is incomplete. "45 He then goes on to advance the theory that "free speech, a
free press and free assembly can serve in checking the abuse of power
by public officials"46 - the checking function - surely a most valuable insight. But Blasi leaves room for Professor Bollinger's tolerance
function, too. 47
Kenneth Karst, as a prelude to developing his views on equality
39. Id. at § 1.04.
40. Blasi, supra note 28, at 523-24.
41. Id. at 524.
42. Id. at 525.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 526.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 527.
47. See Blasi, supra note 13 (which starts its discussion of a theory of prior restraint with the
checking function).
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and the first amendment (what he calls the principle of equal liberty of
expression), states:
The principle of equal liberty of expression underlies important purposes of the first amendment. Three such purposes, not always distinct
in practice, are commonly identified: (1) to permit informed choices by
citizens in a self-governing democracy, (2) to aid in the search for truth,
and (3) to permit each person to develop and exercise his or her capacities, thus promoting the sense of individual self-worth. As a practical
matter, realization of these goals implies realization of the first amendment's equality principle.48

But he admits that:
These purposes are not exhaustive. For example, on another view,
the first amendment serves chiefly as a safety valve, permitting peaceful
reform within a stable system - or, as Herbert Marcuse would have it,
preventing revolution through "repressive tolerance." The function can
be seen more positively as one of legitimizing. Chief Justice Warren remarked in the context of a claim of equal protection: "Any unjustified
discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or
in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government."49

Thus the safety-valve purpose does expressly involve "tolerance" even
if it is "repressive" in Marcuse's terms. Karst does not develop this
thought further, however.
Frederick Schauer's work presents a special case. His and Bollinger's work touch upon some of the same themes. In the highest traditions of academic collegiality Bollinger gives Schauer full credit both
in his acknowledgments (p. vi) and in a footnote (p. 45 n.4) "[f]or a
major, and comprehensive, philosophical critique of prevailing theories of free speech." Schauer's work recognizes that "[t]he modern
conception of freedom of speech has roots in two distinct strands of
thought," one of which "is the theory of religious toleration, as exemplified in Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, Bayle's Treatise on
Universal Toleration, and Turgot's Memoire to the King on Tolerance. "so As stated, the connection between tolerance, or at least religious tolerance, and free speech has been in the minds of philosophers
for some time. But in view of the fact that Schauer and Bollinger have
obviously discussed their ideas on many occasions one is not surprised
to find the former discussing in some depth "the paradox of tolerance," so called by Karl Popper because it is "paradoxical to allow
freedom of speech to those who would use it to eliminate the very
principle upon which they rely." 51 Schauer uses the Skokie case to
48.
49.
(1969);
50.
51.

Karst, supra note 29, at 23 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 23 n.18 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626
citing also c. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 34-55 (1960)).
F. SCHAUER, supra note 30, at 106.
Id. at 160.
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show that the problem is not hypothetical and goes on to argue that,
since we cannot delegate to any licensing authority, county council, or
court the power to withhold speech-making privileges by deciding
which groups threaten freedom and which do not, "the denial of free
speech rights to those who are 'fascists,' 'racists,' or 'totalitarians' is as
much at the core of the Free Speech Principle as would be the denial
of the same rights to Democrats, Republicans, Liberals, Conservatives, or Catholics." 52 It speaks well for Professor Bollinger's intellectual candor that this is one argument that he really does not make for
his tolerance principle - the argument of who will censor the censors
- probably out of respect for a colleague's ideas, even though the
argument is a persuasive one.
Bollinger has made a real contribution to recent literature and
analysis of the first amendment, and nothing that I say below should
be construed as taking from his accomplishment. Still, he makes his
tolerance function seem so obvious that one wonders if one did not just
assume it to be one of the functions of free speech even if not explicitly
stated as such by recent theorists on the subject. As Schauer points
out, toleration has after all been systematically proposed since Locke's
Epistola de Tolerantia, published in 1688. To be sure, Locke was talking principally about religion, but when he spoke about things that
could not be tolerated he addressed opinions, speech, and activity:
(1) the propogation of "opinions contrary to human society, or to those
moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society"; (2)
any claim "to special prerogative opposite to the civil right of the community"; (3) the activity of "persons who are ready on any occasion to
seize the government, and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes
of their fellow subjects"; (4) transferring allegiance to a foreign prince;
and (5) denying the existence of God. 53

In Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural address he spoke of tolerance
in the context of free speech or opinion:
During the contest of opinion through which we have passed, the
animation of discussion and of exertions has sometimes worn an aspect
which might impose on strangers unused to think freely and to speak
and to write what they think; but this being now decided by the voice of
the nation, announced according to the rules of the constitution, all will,
of course, arrange themselves under the will of the law, and unite in
common efforts for the common good. All, too, will bear in mind this
sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to
prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority
possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate
which would be oppression. Let us, then, fellow-citizens, unite with one
heart and one mind. Let us restore to social intercourse that harmony
and affection without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary
52. Id. at 163.
53. 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 145 (1967).
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things. And let us reflect that having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have
yet gained little if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as
wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. During the
throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing
spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long
lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should
reach even this distant and peaceful shore; that this should be more felt
and feared by some and less by others; that this should divide opinions as
to measures of safety. But every difference of opinion is not a difference
of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same
principle. We are all republicans - we are federalists. If there be any
among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. 54

And there were hints, moreover, of the tolerance function, as Bollinger
himself notes in Chapter Five, in the writings of Professor Meiklejohn
and the opinions of Justice Holmes. And the safety-valve function referred to in Brandeis' Whitney passage55 is but a step away, once focus
is upon the audience and not just the speaker. But, of course, the basic
literature has generally looked at free speech from the perspective of
the speaker, rather than the audience. Indeed, it is only in the last few
decades that we have begun to focus upon the audience at all.
Twenty-five years ago Paul Freund put it that "[t]he right to speak
is the individualized legal reflection of the more generalized right to
hear, which is basic to the process of political fiux." 56 While Thomas
v. Collins 57 recognized the rights of workers to hear labor organizers,
it was not until Lamont v. Postmaster General 58 that a first amendment right of a mail recipient was recognized, and a wave of cases59 in
the 1970s generally recognized an independent first amendment right
on the part of an audience or putative audience to hear (though "captive" audiences have long had rights not to hear 60). With this new
emphasis on the audience, it took - in what has been rather an easy
time for free speech - something really extreme, stirring to one's soul,
the Skokie case, to bring out Bollinger's new focus.
54. First Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 4, 1801), reprinted in N. DORSEN, D.
BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (4th ed.
1976) (emphasis added).

55. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
56. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 81 (1961).
57. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
58. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
59. See M. NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 1.02[F][l] & n.37.
60. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105
(1932).
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The Skokie case does summon up in us, as Professor Tribe says, 61
mixed emotions. Why should we tolerate as free speech a march or a
demonstration not only totally antithetical to our democratic views
and principles of religious freedom but also aimed specifically in time
and place at injuring the sensibilities of the very group of people with
the most heightened sensitivity to anti-semitism in its most outrageous
form? Bollinger provides us with a most convincing answer and this
alone is a contribution - by exercising tolerance the impulse to intolerance in each of us is effectively restrained. Norman Dorsen, wearing
his ACLU president's hat, makes a more direct argument for the
ACLU's defense of the Nazis:
It [the "maximum protection" theory which Dorsen espouses] shows
that attempts to prevent peaceful protests are inconsistent with the First
Amendment, whether directed against labor organizers in Detroit, civil
rights workers in the South, antiwar demonstrators at the Pentagon, the
Jewish Defense League in St. Louis, or American Nazis in Skokie,
Illinois. 62

Dorsen argues from a different premise than Bollinger, however. He
reacts from what Bollinger calls the fortress model of free speech; he
would keep the exceptions to the exercise of free speech as narrow as
possible consistent with the survival of our institution of government,
lest the exceptions be too open-ended.
This brings me to the point of perhaps my greatest difficulty with
Bollinger's thesis; he goes beyond recognition of the tolerance function
of free speech by almost considering it at times as the sole function. I
find myself asking the question whether, in expressly declining to proceed from the fortress model, he would open the door to exceptions
beyond "fighting ·words," libel, obscenity, and clear and present danger (redefined)? I read his reliance in Chapter Six on "residual behavior needs" (p. 183) or "the reality of human needs" (p. 187) as
potentially a justification for creating new exceptions or evidencing old
ones. Indeed, why is not intolerance itself a "residual behavior need"?
How, in other words, does one distinguish a "residual human need"
that must be recognized as real from a need that does not have to be
recognized since it is not real? And in line-drawing in specific areas say the law of defamation or the law pertaining to obscenity - how
does this serve as any guide?
I share with Vincent Blasi63 a "pathological" concern for the first
amendment, indeed for the whole Bill of Rights. As I wrote in my
Madison Lecture,
Viewed as an interwoven fabric or spirit, with the creative tension
this implies, the Bill of Rights also takes on a more fragile aspect. We
61. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 219.
62. Dorsen, supra note 10, at 2.
63. See Blasi, supra note 13, at 30.
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come to recognize that the illegal police practice, the abuse of a prison
inmate, the denial of a termination hearing to a welfare recipient, are all
potentially assaults upon our own rights because each of us is protected
only as much as others are. This concept is all the more telling as the
power of government through technology and sheer size becomes the
more awesome and the role of the individual correspondingly less
significant.
. . . Our institutions fortunately do not hang by a thread, but a deep
depression, a serious blow to national pride, extensive internal terrorism,
a serious external threat to security, or a combination of these may enlarge the ranks of the elements of society that are ever ready to abandon
liberty for order and to abandon freedom for security. In the meantime
let us beware lest by default we permit some of these rights to be chipped
away. 64

On this score I find Bollinger's exposition of the tolerance function
lacking. When this is coupled with downplayed concern about the
role of government or a given majority, as I think Bollinger sometimes
tends to engage in, 65 my "pathological" concern gets aroused. 66 While
giving effect to community values and respect to democratic self-government, Professor Bollinger may be a little sanguine - overlooking,
say, the power of an executive branch gone astray (as in Watergate) to
deceive the public, at least for a while. The new term "disinformation" - a government feeding lies to the press to accomplish a foreign
objective - speaks to my concern. The truth-seeking function of free
speech remains high on my agenda, as essential to appropriate selfgovernment.
Saying that, however, I must point out three strengths of the book
which I have not yet mentioned. The first is its recognition, albeit
brief, of the role that religion can play in fomenting divisiveness. 67
Surely any future agenda for the tolerance function or free-speech
thinking must explore and expose this tendency further, in a day when
certain religious leaders are seriously mentioned as thinking, with the
support of their religious constituencies, of running for the highest office in the land, and when in the name of religion humanism in education is reviled or abortion clinics burned out; and there is functioning
in this country a "religious" movement "blending hatred of blacks and
64. Oakes, supra note 14, at 924-25 (footnotes omitted).
65. Seep. 218. But see pp. 111-20.
66. In fairness to Professor Bollinger, he does refer to protection of free speech as "a very
fragile enterprise" (p. 86). This shows his concern for the first amendment but does not close the
door to increasing the scope or number of exceptions to first amendment protection.
67. Here Bollinger recognizes the interrelationship of the speech and religion clauses of the
first amendment. I would go further and point to the interrelationship of the first, fourth, fifth,
sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments. See Oakes, supra note 14, at 919-24. "Time and again it
was in protecting freedom of thought, of conscience, or of expression that the procedural rights
embodied in our fourth through eighth amendments were first asserted, then given substance,
and finally enshrined as basic to our institutions." Id. at 921-22.
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Jews with visions of an imminent apocalypse and advocating - and
sometimes practicing - armed violence to achieve its goals. " 68
The second additional strength is the focus Bollinger brings to bear
on time, place, and manner regulations of speech as intrusive - often
as consequential as content regulation. Suppose, for example, a community were to impose a forty-five day waiting period for marches,
protests, or other public assemblies or demonstrations. Would not
that alone serve to dampen prospective symbolic speech so as to be an
unreasonable intrusion?
Finally, by seeing the role of the free speech cases as one of developing community-wide or nationwide awareness of the complexity of
social issues and the need "to develop and demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings" (p. 10), Professor Bollinger has given us all a
somewhat broader vision. Free speech, he is saying, is not serving just
as a safety valve for audience, speaker, and society generally; it is
awakening us to a new public consciousness of the importance of free
speech. We may hope this is true. Optimists of the human spirit may
always hope for its improvement.
In the end I would say that Professor Bollinger has made a valuable contribution to free speech theory by reexamining the fundamental bases on which freedom of expression rests. He has also recognized
that the first amendment is not self-executing; that the dialogue created by hard cases like Skokie is in and of itself enlightening, if not
upgrading; and that we can wholly agree neither with Mencius that
"the tendency of human nature to do good is like that of water to flow
downward" or with Hsun Tzu that "man's nature is evil. " 69

68. Ostling, A Sinister Search far "Identity," TIME, Oct. 20, 1986, at 74.
69. Bollinger's suggestion that judges' opinions articulate their own feelings about given
speech (pp. 226-36) should be commented upon by a reviewer-judge. I agree that judges should
be aware that they are making value choices, see Oakes, supra note 14, at 929-34, and that
"(j]udges should not overlook or conceal value choices, enshrouding them in some mysterious,
semi-Delphic pronouncements from on high." Id. at 930. Still, to state one's own views of given
speech before addressing the legal consequences or constitutional choices concerning that speech
smacks too much of the ad hoc, personal, state-of-the-digestion jurisprudence that Cardozo long
ago taught us to eschew. See B. CARDOZO, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED
WRmNGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 151 (1947).

